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PUNISHMENT, INVALIDATION,
AND NONVALIDATION:
What H. L. A. Hart Did Not Explain*
Richard Stith
Va lparaiso University School of Law
! laborating first upon H. L.A. Hart's distinction between imposing duties and imposmg disabilities, th1s article explores the two senses mentioned (but not fully explained)
hy Hart in which power-holders may be legally disabled. Legal invalidation (nullification) of norms that have been generated by vulnerable power-holders is seen
•o reduce divcrs1ty or pluralism m every normative sphere, from the supranational
•o the intrafamilial. By contrast, mere legal nonvalidation (noncognizancc) of such
norms tends to preserve the autonomy of the power-holders that created the norms,
•hus cnhancmg legal pluralism. Punishment for creating forbidden norms amounts in
prinCiple to an in-between sort of control, less restnct1ve than completely invalidating
·hem but more restrictive than JUSt not validating them, that is, just ignoring them.
Illustrative examples include the European Court of justice's early use of invalidation
to convert an international treaty into a supranational constitution, and the subtle
effects of legal nonvahdation of same-sex marriage.

One of the fundamental issues to be faced in our er.t of globali1.ation and
\\.tning di\'ersity is the degree to which states and other norm-generc:tting
bodiel> shall be pennitted to dominate infrnnational norm-generating entiun and the degree to which supranational institutions shall be permitted to
dominate states and other norm-generating bodic'i. Recalling the work of
\\t·.,Iey H ohfeld, 1 H. L.A. Han2 helps us understand two con tra'iting methb of testricting an entity endowed with a leg-al pO\\er to generc:ttc norms:
w imposition of duties \"ersliS the imposition of disabilities. Duties forbid
·Jt<tin uses of the power in que tion, often under threat of punishment,
lwrcas disabilities invalidate (nullify) any attempt so to usc that power. In
"' short explonuorv essay, I supplement H art's observations conceming
ne two methods of control or domination, providing conceptual reasons
'uspect that invalidation may be worse than punishment for purposes of
• P.t~r ,ubmiucd for rli'c~ion a1 the "Oiver.tt)' and Lnity" mccung of the- XXIII World
~r"''• lnt('mationale Vctctntgung fi"tr Rcdll.r und Smialplulosophic- Kr.ti:.0\1, Poland,
'I J-6, 2007.
I \\'tst..t.\ 110 HFTIJl, Ft '-1>.\MEli<T.-\l. LFG\1 C.oM.£PTlOS S ( 1923) .

• II. LA. 11.\RT, Tm (~>:-.C.EYT or LA\1 26-41 , 6&-71 (2<1 eel. 1991). 1Ian refc-N to llohfcld
a note to page 66 found at page 289.
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lcg-dl diversity or pluralism. (\\11ethcr or when invalidation is in fact worse
for plurdlism is an empirical question involving man) factors beyond the
scope of this essay.)
I also add and di~cu ·s a further distinction. that between invalidated
exercises of a power and 7WIZYalidated exercises of that power-something
Hart ne,·er clear!) explains. The logic of nonvalidation actually turns out to
benefit pluralism, as we sec below.
I. HART'S DISTINCTIONS
In his classic work, The Concept of Law,?. H art initially contrasts criminal
laws, which can be considered "coercive orders," 1 with "laws which give
powers"5 (such as rules for making wi.lls,6 contracts and marriages,' or city
ordinances11 ), the second t) pe of rule being, in I I art's view, facilitative rather
than coercive.
This is all well and good ,,ith regard to acts that Ma) within the limits of
the conferred legal powers but not always with regard to act<; that exceed
those limit<;. Hart misleads us when he goe on to suggest that there is
always a "rddical difference in function"9 between the Ctiminallaw, whic h is
"designed to suppress" conduct, and power-conferring nile , which "me r~lv
withhold legal recoj.,rnition" 10 from acts that are ultra \'ires: "nullity can
not ... he assimilated to a punishment attached to a rule ac; an inducement
11
to abstain from the activities which the rule forbids."
Hart fails here to
mention that legal nullification or invalidation is capable of being used verv
effectively to control those who possess the power to generate legal norms.
CnrimLsly, in his later discussion of how the highest mle of recognition
(or constitution) can limit legislative powers, Hart focuses precisely upon
what he previously ignored :
I\ const..itut..ion which dfccti'·ely restricts the legislative powers of the supreme
lcgislamre in the ~>)'Stem docs nol do so by imposing (or at any rate ueed not
tmpmc) duties on the le~,'islature nol lo attempt to legislate in certain ways;

3. ld.
4. Jd. at26.

5. ld.
6. ld. at '1.7.
7. Jd.
8. Jcl. at 31.
9. Jdat 3'1..
10. ltl- at 31.
I I . ltL In l11is descr-ipuon of Hart's views of powers ami tht:"ir limits, I do not clistin),~
between privau• powers (suth ;c, the legal powf'r to make a coulrdt tor a will) and publk
(such <IS the lcg<1l power to lf'gislate), bcca~ H art himself conflate> the two. This conll
may han· i>et:"n part of what led Hart to C'Onfusc invalidity (which in domestic law tencl~
to describe tilt• limi!S on public powers) with nonvalidity (which in dnrn!'sti<' law tends~
cle~cribe the lim ill> on prh-dll' powers). as is shown later in this I:'SSa).
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instead it pnl\idc that any such purportt'd legislation shall be \oid. It imposes
not legal duties but legal disahilities. 11

Invalidation serves here as a functional alternative to punishment, leading
the Ie~-,rislatur<:> to sta} \\ithin its prcscriherl sph<:>re. The constitution makers
have used null it' as a means of controlling the law makers.
Disabilities are in fact a ''"irlelv eflective wav to resu i<.t the exercise of
powers, even though I latt never applies this insight to the lower levels of
those <:>mpowered to generate legal norms (e.g., contmct and city ordinance
makers) that he discusses initially. The present essa)- fills this gap b) showing
the dominating impact of invalidation on all t) pes of norm generators
and then (in its last sections) <;uggests that TIan neglects ro discu~ this
impact because he sometimes conflates rcstricthe invalidation and tolerant
nomalidation.

II. PUNISHMENT AND INVALIDATION
Let us begin ''ith a simple modeL Suppo<;e C.tptain C hac; plenary legal
power over Sergealll S, who in tum has plenaq legal power ow•r Private P.
(Assume for <;implicit\' that no moral or other nonlegaluorms exist among
C, S, and P.) Suppose funher that C thiuks P is becoming too exhausted
from the daily hikes ordered b)'S anrl wishes to stop tomorrow's hike from
t.tking place. C decides to do so bv imposing a duty on S; C tells S, "You
,hall not order Pout on a hike tomorro\\." Let us also assume that C and
S understand that S ,,;11 be punisherl if S does not rom pi) with C's ordet:
1Suppose also that the duties S imposes on P are hacked by threats ot
punishment bv S for noncompliance by P.) ~otc that, b} hypothesis, C has
hnc decided to control S solely h\ creating a rlury for S, u ot b\' imposing
.lll\ disabilit} on S.
If S neYettheless orrlers P out on a hike, must P obey? The answer i<; n •..,,
I•" S's power O\Cr P hac; been in no way limited. S has a rlut) not to send P
out, hutS hac; no disability that would pre,·ent S ti·om doing so. \\1tat \\ill
tht·n happen if S disobe}S C by ordering P out, anrl P disobcy1> S by refusing
tu ~o? Both Sand P \\ill have 'violated a lq.r<~l duty, so both ''"ill he punished
~ their respective supetiors. This in fact is probahlv how things would work
out 111 the military.
What if C could have taken a different tack, more ci,ilian than militaf)
t"thos? Let us imat-,rine that instead of imposing any duty whatsoever on
<. derides to protect P solei} b) cutting back on S's power, imposing a
H.trt-t,·pe disability on S by saying, "You haYe no power to order P out on
hilt• tomorrow." If S still o rrlers P out, P has no dut)' to obey. So "hat
ppt•ns now if P refuses S's invalid order? Nritlll"r S nor P will be punished,
- ld

.It 69.
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for neither ,;olated anv dUl\. 13 This, indeed, is ho\\ \\C ordinarii) deal \\ith
state (or prO\incial) legislators who ,;oiate federal (or national) law when
they purport to pass statutes. Since the state legislator.. are Iegalh disabled
from passing statutes in violation of federal legal rules, such statutes would
be declared invalid. But neither the legislators nor am citiLens who refu e
to obc} the legislators would be pun ishcd. 11
There appear to be many advantages-as well as ome disadvantages-to
disabilities-cum-invalidation over duties-rum-punishment as a method of conuolling persons (or institutions) ltke S that are mid-level norm generators.
For one thing, im-dlidation would seem to be cheaper in that imprisonment
is a\oided. Furthermore, etl<.'ttive im-alidation requires a more open and
participatory societ} in which P know., of the right to refw;e S's order. Duucs
are enforced top·dmm while disabilities arc made effective largcl} bottomup. P mav also preferS to ha\c a disability (rather than a dut}) because a
disabilitv provides P \\ith a secure ·immunitY~ (H ohfeld's term) against any
S<ommanded duty to hike rather than just a freedom from such a duty,
a freedom that is precarious berau e it is re\'O<..able at an} moment by S
(despite an> dut) C has imposed on S). On the other hand, a dutv-ou ly
approach (\\ itltout anv imposed disabilit}. as in our fir<;t scenario) ma\ be
better for cfftriency, sccreC), and other militarv values. We shall sec that the
dutv-onl)' approach also has the advantage of securing legal independence
or pluralism, as we later examine <l legal world far remo,·ed from militan
precision. In the "dualist" conception, as we shall see, intemational law is a
law that imposes only duties, not domestic disabilities, upon states.
Howe,·er, rather than exploring all the ad\antages of imposing disabilities and / or duties, this essa)' focuses upon onlv one comparison. It seek.~
to understand whether punishment or im-alidation tends logicalh toward
hrrcater domination of intermediate norm generator like S. At first sight,
punishment may seem the harsher form of domination, because scemingl}
the most painful. Indeed, ac; we see abo\'e, Hart denies that "nullity" ran
e'en be considered a sanction, which of course is correct in the sense that it
is ordinarily not a separable penal tv added to the criminal act. Furthermore,
Hart often mini miLes any restrictive effects of disabilitics. 15 And after all,

13. Coercion ~till lurk.> m the- background, ho\\e\t:r, ino;ofar <1.'> S may no\\- bt• liablc tn ~
puni\hed by C tf he ~hould undertakc.- to puru!.h P for rdw.mg to com pi~ \\ith S's imalid orcin:
14. \\e rntght still 53~. as .t matter of ordinary language, that the 'tall" lcgisl<ttorN h.t'C' a
duty to abide bv ledc.-ral Ia" il'> wt"ll as a di<.ability to dt:\l.tte from it, but in any C\t>nt !.-uc'lt
di5abtlit:y-("nforccd dutit>s arc not ord inarily bad.ed bv threat!. of puni!.hment. Accororng ID
Mad bon ·~ note~ on the American Con.>Ututional Comenrion, the method of enforcing fed~
law on the ~tales hy means of itwalioation of de\iancc rather than b\ mean~ of pum.,hmcnt fi
de\ i,mce was c ho!.en .rt 11:-ast parth lx-rame the Iauer approadt rould ha\t~ required fedenl
militan intervention 'loiB 01 OFR\TES t~ tiiF Fro£RAl. Co~n:l'.-n0'-1 Ot 1787 RE.POKil n Blj
~1Alli-.<>N 45, 88-89 (Norton, 1966).
15. Hart states, for example, that a "Junge ... mav lx- indiflert>nt to the \alidity of his orcks.
H 1\RT, Jupra note- 2, at 31.
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the person solely under disabilities remains at liberty to behave as he wishes;
his acL'>jul>l do not generate duties for olhers (or for himscll).
Yet does having duties not leaveS with a 1-,rreater degree of norm-issuing
freedom? If no disabilities arc imposed on him, S may still either create a
duty for P (and maybe get punished) or else not create such a duty. S gets
to choose. Increased certainty and severity of threatenerl punishment will,
withoutanr doubt, yield greater empirical compliance by S. However, threats
of future punishment can never amount to control in the absolute sense of
the physical forcing of a person's body to do someone else's will or otherwise
making disobedience impossible. Ewn in the face of the maximum possible
threat--certain and eternal damnation-the one choosing whether to sin
can claim ..I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul. "Hi
Invalidation, by contrast, restricts norm generation <1bsolutely. If S is
stripped of his power to create a duty for P, the creation of a rluty tor P
becomes impossible for him. He is forced to conform to C's wishes. JTe
can no longer choose to be an outlaw. This is a clear loss of freedom for
S-and perhaps of dignit} as well, e\en if P docs not decide to act cockily
and strut his new rights. Going back to religion ag-ain, when God told Arlam
and Eve that they would be punished if they ate the forbidden fruit, they
were still left with free will-with the choice to sin or not. Invalidation is
the equivalent of God putting a force field around the tree, stopping them
absolutely from eating its fruit. The force field would have wholly deprived
them of freedom to pick the fruit and of any dignity that comes with that
freedom. In terms ofliberty, it is less restrictive to have one's hands slapped
1han to ha,·e them tied.
~1oreo,cr, as a conceptual matter, punishment in itself (without invalidation) result'> in greater legal pluralism-more independent legal systems or
,pheres-than docs invalidation in it<ielf (withom punishment). Where C
,ubjects S only to duties (even backed by certain and severe punishments),
one need look only to S in order to know P's duties. There may be two
<.t"parate legal spheres quite independent of each othet, one centered on
(.and the other on S. By contra<;t, if C uses disabilities to controlS, Swill
ha\'e a reduced sphere within which S can shape the law for P. ln order
to know P's duties, one must now refer to the acts of C as well a<; to the
(ommands of S, for some of the latter may have been invalidated by the
former. For C to convert his orders from duties to disabilities would thus be
ro abrogate much of S's ability to create an autonomous legal sphere. The
pluralism left intact by C not imposing disabilities on S should be favorerl
tr. the military because instant obedience by Pis an important good and P
n more quickly and easily discover his duties if he need not look beyond
t' commands of S.

lh
-~~~.

William Emest Henley, lnvrctus, in MoDER.'! BKIIISH POt. I KY (Lou is
rwailablt at http://wW\\.bartlt>by.com/ I 03/ 7.hllul.

l.;ntermcycr
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The preservation of such legal pluralism likewise must be a primary rcason why countries such as the United Kingdom ha\C traditionally adhered
to the "dualist" understanding of international versus national law referred
to abme. Precisely insofar as international Ia\\ can impo e only duties, it
can ne\'er in any wav affect the Btitish Parliament's monopoly of domestic lawmaking power. Under a dualist regime, international treaties haYe
no domestic e!Tect unless and until they are implemented by the national
lcgislantre. 13} contrast, a .. monist" approach to international law allows international norms to supplement and even to invalidate national ones, thns
creating a single legal universe with concomitalll loss of national sovereignty.
Since some of us may not have much sympathy for sergeants, let us leave
our simple C-S-P model and look further at the analogous way · in which
invalidation can diminish political independence among nations. The legal
history of the European Community offers us a powe1 ful example of how the
shift from duties to disabilities changed independent nations into subparts
of a new legal entity. Such a seismic shift is by no means unthinkable in
other regional economic associations as well and e\'en on a world scale
through organit.ations such as the United Nations and the World Trade
Organintion.
From its inception, the European Community treat) contained legal duties imposed on its members as well as \'arious enforcement mechanisms
a~-,rainsr \'iolaLOrs of those dutics. 17 The fact that these enforcement mechanisms were original!} emisioned by the signatories of the treaty shows clearly
that the signawries assumed that member states might violate rhe treaties,
that is, that violation was possible. However, in 1963 and 1961, in the ~'t.zn
Cend m toos and Co.~ta cases, 18 the European Court of justice took it upon
itself to convert certain of those duties inLO disabilities, making violation of
the treaties impos:.ible.
The specific duty invol\'cd in the \fan Gend Pn Loos case was the duty not
to raise tariff.<; on imports from other member states. The Court found that
by reclassifYing a certain good, the Netherlands in cncct had increased its
import tariff on that good. :-.Jo problem so far. According to the treaties, I he
Netherlands was thus su~ject to being prosecuted for its treaty violation.
But the Court decided that the rule against raising tariffs would be more
"effective" if raising tarif!:S were converted from something prohibited 10
something impossible. The Court declared the increase in tariff to be simpll
invalid; the importer was told, in effect, that he need not comply \\ith
Dutch law, or rather, that the Dutch law in question did not really exisL
The Netherlands did not have to be condemned as a lawbreaker becau~
it was disabled from breaking the law no matter how hard it tried (and so
17. The an.ides refeneclto here were first nnmhercd 169-171 but m·e 11m' Article~ 226-2'l8
of the T1·eat) F.st.ahlishing the. European L' nion. The specified puni~hment J(lr violatiom, nnw
founrl in Artklt· 228, W<L~ not pre~cnt in the mid-1 960s, howe\ cr.
18. Ca)c 26/ 62, Van G<>nd en Loos ' · Ncderlandse \dmini>rraue dcr Bclastingen, 1965
E. CR. I; Ca!>C 6/ 64. CosLa,._ ENF.L, l 904 E.C.R. 585.
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treaty procedures for a posteriori prosecution lost much of their point).
next year, in Costa, the Court reaffirmed it'i supranationalist position
gteater clarity, and founeen years later, in Simmenlha~ 19 it made clear
t e\eu rules long found in national constitutions have no domestic legal
ret if thev contravene subsequent treaty nonns.
Ordinal) legal reasoning would have held that if there were a contlict
·een an earlier domestic constimtional nonn and a later imernationaJ
ary norm, the treat) norm would be the one that would be invalid under
me~tic law, although (according to dualist reasoning) the nation in ques~n might still be su~ject to condemnation and possibly a penalty under
ternationallaw.
One might pause here to note an outstanding feat ofjudicial activism: the
luropean Court ofjustice created a new polity by changing an international
tn-aty into a const.itution.~0 But let us keep our attention fixed on the
etherlands. European Community law penetrated and took possession of
Dutch law, making Dutch dissenters (here, those who objected to paying the
lil.x) the agents of Europe. From that point on, European norms would be
directly applicable and supreme in Dutch courts and in all other domestic
mstin1tions, and the European Court would defend the rights of Dutch
mdividuals against the Dutch people.
lJnder this new legal rchrimc, the European Community became able to
dominate the etherlands far more "effectively" (ac; the European Court
aptly recognized) than it could have done by means of mere duties. \J\'hethcr
this is good or bad depends to a great extent on how much we care about
Dutch political and cultural unity and independence, on the one hand, and
the individual freedoms of Dutch traders, on the other.
We can, however, make some generalizations. It is no doubt true that the
person on the ground, the individual citizen, has more freedom from rluties
under a system in which intermediate authorities are limited by invalidation,
as compared to one in which they are limited only by punishmeut. Invalidation inherently fa,ors individual liberty to hdzaveas one wishes insofar as
it reduces the total number of duties with which individuals have to comply
b' invalidating some of them, cutling down on the dutv-generating power
of some of their political superiors. It is tautologically true that limiting
government is good for Iibert} from go,·ernment.
At the same time, invalidation sharply curtails group and even individual
autonomy, for to be auto-nomoLLS (self-lawgiving) would seem to include precisely the ability to create duties for oneself. If only the threat of punishment
is imposed on a group, it can still decide to resist its overlord ac; long as it is
willing to chance suffering the prescribed sanction. If the duties the group
19. Case 106177, Amministr.t7ione delle Finan£e dello StallI v. Simmcnthal SpA, 197R F..C.R.
629.
l!O. For reflections on the Court\ bootsuapping. seeR Stith &.J.H.H. Weiler, Car~ Trl'flty T.n w
lk SujJrmu, Diri'Ctly Ejjeclwt and .\uto11mnmu-ML at/Itt Same llmc7 (1\n l~jJi.\lnlnry F.wllllllJ{e), 31

'\.Y.U . .J. b'T'L L. & Pot.. 729 (2002).

226

RICHARD STITH

(e.g., the Dutch people) decides to impose on ito;elf can be invalidated
from above, the f.,TTOup has lost its autonomy. Moreover, a degree of indi\idual freedom has been lost as well: the freedom to effectuate legal change
through the legal process. A Dutch voter can no longer aim to reclassify
imports in a way that raises any tariffs, if such acl'i arc legal nullities.
Individual autonomy (binding oneself by a mle) can suffer still more
seriously from invalidation. Consider the power to contract, a form of private lawmaking. Even if contracts were punished, as long as they remained
valid, the choice to create legal duties for oneself would remain open. For
example, if contracl..'. to pay gambling debts were no longer invalid (as they
usually are now) but were instead merely punishable, individuals could still
bind themselves by law to pay such debts. (Of course, if the punishment were
severe and certain, they would be unlikely to exercise this lawmaking freedom.) Again, where marrying without a license (e.g., so-called "commonlaw" marriage) is illicit but still valid (e.g., in the law of equity), perhaps
even punished but not nullified, indi\iduals retain more ability to marry
unofficially than they would if an unlicensed marriage were wholly invalid.
Likewise for bigamy: if a second marriage were possible but punishable,
the ability to have multiple spouses would be far greater than it is now, econd marriages being null. Similarly, if same-sex marriages somehow were
prohibited and punished (even by a term in jail) but remained valid once
illegally begun, gays and lesbians would ob\iously ha,·e much more power
to bind themsch·es in marriage than under today's regimes in which their
marriages are an absolute nullity. 21
I conclude that invalidation is an enormously powerful tool of dominaLion, more powerful than punishment alone as a means to limit the autonomy of groups and even of indhiduals. Insofar as we may wish to preserve
pluralism in law and legal culture, we must be careful to di-;tinguish invalidation from punishment and to use the former with caution as we build
new leg-al orders in the world.
Ill. NON VALIDATION

Anyone familiar with Hart's initial discussion of legal powers and their
limits will find it hard to imagine that he and 1 are describing the same
legal phenomenon. As we see briefly aboYe, Hart at first depicts legal powers as wholly beneficent, as simply intended to facilitate decentralized lawmaking. So he says that the purpose of requiring two witnesses for a will's
validity or reciprocal consideration for contractual validity is just to give
people easy-to-follow recipes for making rules that the government will enforce. Moreover, the disabilities implied here (no legal validity without two
2l. Of cour~e. whc1e invalidation and punishment are combiut>d, iudi~idual~ are ma.'l.imally limited. American law does this to prevent big;un' b) boU1 declaring ~cond marriages
impossible and puni~hinK those who attempt to do what C. legally impo!>Siblc.
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tnesses or without consideration) arc not in I ended to stop a dying person
m informally communicating her wishes to just one witness nor to stop
om1al promising v..ithout any reciprocall:x>ncfit.
Hart is indeed correct that his early examples do not have the supprcse aims or consequences discussed above in the hypothetical example
CJI the military superior and the actual example of the European Community. It would be very strange to see the rules for wills or contracts as
draconian means of making testation-without-two-witnesses and promises"ithout-reciprocity impossible. No one seeks to put an end to deathbed
rrquests and extralegal promises. The law doe~ not validate such informal
iikl~ but it has nothing ag-ainst their ha ...ing social force. Yet, as Hart later
discusses, when a constitution imposes limits on legislative power, such as
a rule against raising import taxes, its purpose is to make such ultnt vires
ans ineffective, to deprive them of all social force, just as C's disabling of
S was meant to stop P from ha...ing to go out on a hike. The nature of th is
difference, I maintain, can be grasped by understanding the first discussion
in Hart's classic work to deal \vith nomttlidation and the second to deal with
irl\ttlidation. 112
Invalidation occurs when one normative order declares the rules of another order to be no longer internally binding, to be nullities within that
other order. Nonvalidation occurs when a normative order refuses within
itself to recognize and efTectuate the rules of another order but docs not interfere with continued recognition and effectiveness of those nonns within
that other order.
Thus, for example, invalidation occurs when C declares that S has no
power over P, perhaps even impl)ing that P can come to C for a remedy if
S nc\ertheless should attempt to use illicit force ag-ainst P. Nomr<Liidation
of S's order would mean only that C \viii not treat P's refusal to hike as an
offense against C. Again, invalidation occurs when the European Court tells
participants in the Dutch legal order that tariff increases are no longer to
be treated by them as valid >vithin the Netherlands. Nonvalidation would
mean only that Dutch domestic tariff reclassifications do not count as valid
accommodations of the .:-.:etherlands's international treaty obligations.
Nonvalidation of promises made without consideration lets them retain
whatever normative force they have as a moral matter; they are simply not
enforced in courL Another example: a secular state may refuse to validate
religious man;age \'OWS legallv \\ithout necessarily seeking to invalidate
them from a social perspective. Only if it sought to do the latter would the
22. Set' ll~rn , ~upra note 2, at 26, 27, 3 I, 32, 31, 69. The clislinclion in this essay between
nomalidation and irwalidation overlaps to some dcgre<."with that between ·,oid" and ",·oiclable"
or"null" and "nullifiable" acLs and like distin~ttons. \'oicl atts are simpl) ignored by thf' law (e.g.,
a "marriage" of two six-year-<>lds or "legislatton" bv a Ia\\ faculty establishing a nation a.! religion)
because they arc wholly null. \'otdable acts are one~ that originally have some leg-al existence
thar the law may undertake to nullifv (e .g., a marriage caused by fraud in some essential
re.pect or legislation by Congrc~ establishing a religion). fhe fomtca rna) be, surpri~ingl),
more fa,·orable to pluralism than lhe latter, as we see he low.
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state aim to interfere radically with the autonomy of the moral ordet;ngs
formed by such nonlegal vows.
Par.tdoxicall), then, although the difference between invalidation and
nomalidation may seem but a nuance, it matters greatly. \Vhile invalidation
is bv ib definition more effective than punishment in stopping intermediate
norm generation, nonvalidation i more benign thaJt punishment in letting
such norm generation continue. Invalidation of matrimonial promi es rc.:stricts them more ahsolutcl} than docs even se\ere punishment for making
such promises, hut e\cn a mild punishment would be more inhibiting than
mere nonvalidation of such promises (i.e., simply ignoring them) would be.
This conceptual distinction between invalidation and nom"<~.lidation ma}
stand out still more clearly if we re\erse for a moment the order of morality
and legality, illuminating two differing \\a}-s in which moralit\ ma} pass
judgment on law.
We discnss above how law may fail to validate moral nonns legal I) without
thcreh} aiming to invalidate them morally. A'i a posithist, I lan rnal...cs a
similar point with regard to moral invalidation of law. A1-,rainst the radical
claim that "an unjust law is not a Ia\\," that is, that an uqjust, immoral
law is legally invalid, Hart asserts that a properly enacted law remains such
even if it is nonbinding in a moral o;ense. For Hart, a legal rule cannot he
invalidated by moralit}, though it rna} well be nonvalid in terms of moral
obligation. Hart makes this distinction in important part for the sal...c of
p luralist thought, seeking to preserve a conceptual separation between law
and morality \\ithout disparaging the role of either. 23
Here is a succinct example illustrating the inner logic of the po<>sibilitic~
we are dio;cw;sing in oi-der of increasingly greater restriction on internH.'"diate nonn generation: validation, nonvalidation, punishment, and finally
invalidation.
Suppose that two parents are having trouble getting their child to go to
bed by 9 P.M. They might wish f(>t· the state to validatt' the 9 1'. 1\t. duty they
have imposed on their child in order to gi\e that duty greater authori!\. But
if state law refuses to back the parents up officially, this nont~alidation (the
mere absence of official recognition) causes them no loss. The filial duty to
obe} remains intact as a matter of mor<~.lity, religion, custom, and the like.
By contrast, the tate could declare that making a child go to bed so carl}
is child abuse and could forbid the parents to impose a 9 1'.1\t. bedtime,
backing up thi'i state-imposed parental duty with a threat to punish them if
they continue to tell their child to go to bed by 9 p.m. Yet at the mnc time,
state law might still say and do nothing regarding the moral, religious, and
other nonns that would support am 9 P.~t. duty upon which the parents
migh t defiantly insist. The filial duty to go to bed could thus remain intact,
albeit nomolidated (and e\cn punished) as a matter of state law.

2~.

/d. at 207-212.
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Finally, the state could declare iL<;elfsupreme a nd d irectl) efTcctive in all
nonnative realm.,, mtJalidating c,·ery sort of norm requiting going to bed
at 9 1'.\t. and informing the child of its moral and le~al righ t to sta) up
late. Clearly, tl1i~ lac;t ell.et ti),c of state power could be the m ost desu•rclive
of family autonomv. Yet there is a condition afTecting i~ cffican slill to be
d ic;cmsed.

IV. A FURTHER CONDITION FOR NONVALIDATION
The \cry possibilit\- of nonvalidation (rather than im~aJidation) of an act
depends on the act in question having some force or purpose independent
of the achievement oflcgal validity in the normathe order that is gran ting
or deming '>Uch validit).
lf ''e look back to Hart's nonreprcssive sor~ of disabilities, such as
the di ability to make legally enforceable contrac~ in the absence of reciprocal consideration, we can see that the power-holders iu qnec;tion
ha\e no desire to have their nonvalidated infonnal acts become legally
validated. :-.Jo one is demanding that the set of "tontracts \\ithout con,ideralion" or the c;et of "wills with only one wiUlc'>l> ~ become valid (as
t~pposed to arguing that particular acll> do not fall ''ithin these sets). 24
:\orwalidation is an option because eVCI)'One i!, satisfied to have the Ia\\
rgnore '>UCh informal norm creation.
Consider, bv con~dSt, the foJJo,,ing report: in 2007, the .\'l'w York Tzmrs
r.tn a story about parents who had organi1ed to obtain birth tertificates for
their ~tillhorn children. The\ wanted the state to certifY that their children
had once existed. "It's about dij:.,rn ity and validity. lr'o; the same rca.-.on why
we want things like marriage licensee;," declared a leader.2'' Insofar as parents come to depend upon state validation fo r the Yery existence o f theit
1 hildrcn and marriages, they gi\'e nonvalidalion the same etlt:ct over their
lr\TS a-. invalidation would ha\'e. Furthermore, b~ insisting upon validation,
they tempt the state to extend its power. It would require great se lf~rel>tr.tint
.md a kind of paternalism on the pan of the state fo• it to resist this otler
nf overlordship--for the state to tl)' to encourage these patent'> to seek tl1e
.,,urance the} net'd from nonstate sources. After all, if lhe state does nothmg, it will be blamed for the nonexistence of kev family goods, c;o (unless
rt would inwr large costs in doing so) it might ac; well get into the husine l>
or deciding which children and marriages deserve legal recognition. ln at
kast a de facto sense, lhe option of nonvalidation no longer C'xic;ts, because
the parcntc; have abdicated their extralegal autonom y.
24. nw n·ason lor thi~ apathv is ob\touslr that minimally adt:4L1..1le reciprocal consideration
nd a second \\illlt""-~ amount to \irtually cos tiel<> lonnalities, so lhat k" tf any l'arl" about ha\'ing
, lit within thcit :.trit hur'
:2.'•. Tamat Lewin, Out nfC.11'f (,rvws an AdvornryforI ega/ CntifirnLP nJSIILI.bom Btrlh. :\! .'\~ Tt~fi'S,
l.t\ 22, 2007, at \16 (quotmg thl" woman ""ho ~tartecl tht' moH·mcllt"}.
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In like manner, if the bedtime-concerned parents discussed abme feared
to cxetcise any extralegal authority so that they felt they could not ~
their children to do anvthing except that \\hich th(" l>tate would reco1,rni~
and suppor1, the) would ha\e voluntarily relinquished th("ir normathc Illdependence. There would no longer be an~ family sphere that could ht
left mere!) nonvalidated bv the stale (and thus still normativeh binding tn
nonlegal ways).-''ti
ln other words, Hart's disabilities are stably nonreslricti\c-open to continuing interpretation as nonvalidation rather than a<; in\'alidation-onh
insofar as two conditions obtain. First, the 1.uperior order must impose a
disability only as to ill> own legal order; it must not neg-t1te the informal
norms (or nonns operative in a separate leg-al sphere) supporting the practice in question, such as the practice of informal promising or raising impo11
ta"cs; it mtL'it not reach down to destroy an othenvise autonomous nonnative order. Second, that latter order must have internal strength; it tnu5t
not come to depend for its imcmal validity on higher-level recognition or
even on the absence of higher-level invalidation. Informal promi ing cannot remain full) autonomous if onl} noninvalidated promising comes to be
felt binding, nor can Dutch law remain autonomous if it refuses to enforce
an) laws that have been rejected in the international realm. A nation whose
own constitution i entirely monist \\ith rebrard to international law depend~
for ill> independence upon the pleasure of the m.tke• and interpreters of
international law.
Indeed, if a lower-lc\el nonnative community has 'iufficient c;trength, it
may e'en be able to counter a higher legal authority's allt:mpll> to imalidatc
its norms. l .ower-lcvel actors may continue to abide by officiall) invalidated
n01rns, that is, the)' mav treat those nom1s as merely nonvalidated. Thus
even common-law maniages and gambling debts that are wholly imalid
according to state law may in fact retain significant force fm the parties
engaged in them. Like\\<ise, a powerful country (e.g., the United States)
may simply ihrnore the findings of some international legal tribunal that
certain domestic norms lack \alidicy• (e.g., certain pmcedures for imposing
the death penalt}') . ln the same wa), a fiercely ftlial child could treat an
officially inv-alid bedtime rule as rnerclv nomalid and insi ton obsenring it.
Indifference to official invalidation can tum it practicallv inLO nonvalidation.
A din:rse or plural legal world thus docs not depend only on making national and supranational orders less hegemonic; it depends also on persons
~6. J o hu Fim1i~ agrees mth H. L.A. Han that a moralh unjust Ia" 1emai ns .1 \alid hm for
many 1-"'rpo~es (lor exam pi<', tlmt of conceptual clarit)), .dheat non,alid ~ ,, moa .tl nonn. Yet
iua.smuch as th<" foe. a! sen..e of law, for Finni\, contains a mor.1.l obhgauon of obedience, an
unjiLst law cannot be a Ia'' in thi\ full focal sense. j<HI'I
NI\Tl.H..\1 LAw \1\D '1\Tl R"-1
RIGIITS 351-36!! ( 1980). rr (or \\'hen or \\here) a Ia\\ lllllSt be mOI.tl in order tO count as a law,
momlicy cau onh valid.!le or invalld.ttt" it; an tmju$t Ia\\ that as merely morallv nonvalid {but
not lcgallv imalid) <an b\ definition no longer ehl5t. r.," sun end<'r<i 11!1 syst<"mic independence
iu~ofar a.s it needs moral \.llidauon.
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and groups refraining from seeking higher recognition or enforcement of
their internal norms. It could be unfortunate for humanity if each and
t>very human norm were subject to state validalion, even if most were to
be granted legal validity. We might not \vish every promise, every private
family and fdendship event or duty, to be registered and overseen even by
.1 benevolent State. In like manner, we might not wish every national law to
be subject to the approval of even the most well-intentioned international
or supranational legal regime.

V. THE EXAMPLE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
-\ useful illustration of the ambiguous benefh of state validation and yet
the complexity of resistance can be seen in the topic of same-sex marriage.
Deparling from its draconian treatment of bigamy (and, historically, misce~enation), current American Jaw nowhere "prohibit-;" extralegal same-sex
marriage in the sense of punishing it; people of the same sex have full
bchaviontl Iibert} to engage in wedding ceremonies, to bind themselves
rnorall} and even by leg-al contract regarding property and the like, and to
live together thereafter. 27 But, except in Massachusetts2R and California,2v
.\merican law docs not validate such marriages qua marriages. By and large,
the law just ignores them-leaves them alone.
The current debate over same-<;ex marriage may mrn precisely on the
distinclion between invalidation and nonvalidation. Some may view the
, urrent absence of validation of same-sex marriage as a relatively tolerant
,ystern of nonvalidation, one that leaves gay and lesbian cultural norms
intact and unregulated. Others may view the current legal regime as closer
to relatively hostile invalidation, which declares such unions to be without
practical effect.
Perhaps the status of same-sex bonds depends upon rhe purpose of marriage for the gay and lesbian community or upon the purpose of each
mdh idual same-sex marriage for those entering into it. If the point of
..."lme-sex marriage is to gain the tax and retirement benefits hitherto open
only to heterosexuals or to obtain a supposed moral imptimatur from the
l.lw, refusal of legal recognilion amounts in effect to invalidation, whatever
11s intent ma} be. I n order to obtain these goods, validation would have
to be sought, even at the price of regulation (e.g., application of bigamy
tnd divorce law). By contrc:tSt, if those entering such a marriage were contt•nt to bind themselves bra mutual promise of lifelong fide lity or content
to secure nonlegal forms of moral recognition by the community, legal

'1.7. Richard Stith, KP?JingFrimd.ship C'nrrgulatl'd, 18 NoTRF DA.~tE.J.L. Ell iiC~ & Pl'B. PoL\'
(200~) . n. 4.
:?8. Su Goodridge v. DcpL of Public llcalth, 440 Mass. 309, 798 X.F..2d 941 (2003).
:?9. ~In re Maniagc Cal;c~. 43 Cal.4lh 757 [76 C.al.Rpu·.:ld 683, IR3 P.3d 3!!41 (200R).
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nourccogniLion would do little or nothing to undo those effect<; and could
be more appropriately characteri?ed as nomalidaLion.
Failure to pcrcehe the difference between invalidation and nonvalidation
may lead lesbian and gay communiLies to think tha t state validation is a
prerequisite to all normative stature, not reali7ing that nonvalidation could
actually be a means to protect the moral and social autonom} of same-sex
unions. By comparing onlv invalidation and validation, the} rna} fail to
consider nomr.alidation as a possible way to achieve normative stature while
avoiding state intrusion into private life.
VI. CONCLUSION

Invalidation of duties that have been generated by \1.llncrablc normaLive
orders can reduce di\etsity or pluralism in evcrv sphere, from the supranaLional to the inrrafamilial. In contra.'it, nonvalidation of those same duties
may preserve the autonomy of the normative spheres in which the duLies
atise. Punishment for creati ng forbidden duties amounts in principle to
an in-between sort of control, less restrictive than completely nullifying the
duties but mo re restrictive than just ignoring their existen ce. Once properly
clarified , Hart's work helps us understand these fundamental distinctions.

